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(ii)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 17350, 17351, 17358

Vs.

LARRY ELLIOT and WILLIAM
H. CLAYTON,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellants were charged by information, filed on 5 June,
1980, for violating provisions of Section 76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, to wit: engaging in a sexual act involving
the genitals of one person and the mouth of another, without the
consent of the victim, DENNIS FRAZIER, compelling submission to
the said sexual act by the threat of death or serious bodily
injury to be inflicted imminently on the said DENNIS FRAZIER.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were found not guilty of violating Section
76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), but were found guilty of violating Section
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76-5-403 (2), forcible sodomy, a lesser included offense.

Bot!

Appellants were subsequently committed to the Utah State

Pri~

serve terms of not less than one year nor more than fifteen

~

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully seek reversal of the lower Court'
judgment or, alternatively, an order remanding the case for a
trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants were charged with having violated Section
76-6-405(1) (a) (ii), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

The Trial Cour·

instructed the jury relative to that Section as well as to one
lesser included crime, to wit: Section 76-5-403(2), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, Forcible Sodomy.

Counsel for Appellant,

CL~

had submitted a written request for an instruction on Section
76-5-102.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Assault by a Prisoner.
record does not indicate CLAYTON'S counsel objected to the Coo
refusal to so instruct.

Appellant, ELLIOT'S, counsel made an

request, in chambers, for instructions on Section 76-5-102, Ut
Code Annotated, 1953, Assault, and Section 76-5-103, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, Aggravated Assault.

Elliott's counsel did~

to the Court's refusal to instruct on those two Sections (See:
Minute Entry, "Trial", Page 60 of the Record on Appeal and

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Transcript of Trial, Page 237, Line 1.)
The facts relative to the criminal activity involving
Appellants and occuring on the night of 4 May, 1980, at the Utah
County Jail vary according to which witness one chooses to
believe.

Those facts are addressed later herein.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

THIS COURT MAY PROPERLY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SECTIONS 76-5-102.5,
76-5-102, AND 76-5-103, AS THESE REQUESTS WERE
SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT IN A TIMELY MANNER.

This Court has previously ruled that it may exercise its
discretion to review an orally requested instruction. See State v.
Bell, 563 P2d 186,

(1977).

Appellant Elliott's oral request for

instructions on Sections 76-5-102 and 76-5-103 were apparently
taken in chambers immediately prior to reading the approved
instructions to the jury.

Elliott's counsel further objected to

the Court's refusal to so instruct, in the record.
request and objections appear to both be timely.

Elliott's
It appears from

the Minute Entry, "Trial", Page 60 of the Record on Appeal, that
discussion also was had on Elliott's request.

Appellants'

assignment of error to the Trial Court's refusal to instruct on
the crimes of Assault and Aggravated Assault is in a proper
posture to be reviewed by this Court, at its discretion, pursuant
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to Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 51,
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant Clayton's written request for an instruction m
Section 76-5-102.5 was apparently also discussed and

argued,~

chambers, prior to reading the instructions to the jury,

alt~

the nature and extent of those arguments are nowhere noted in
record.

Clayton's counsel did not make a record of his object

to the Court's refusal to instruct on that section.

However,

this request was written and in the file of the matter, and
subsequently argued for in Chambers, it was certainly brought
sufficiently to the attention of the Trial Court in time

for~

be included in the approved instructions had the Trial Court f:
it appropriate.

Appellants urge, notwithstanding Clayton's

failure to make a record of his objection to the refusal to
instruct on Section 76-5-102.5, that this Court exercise its
discretion and review the refusal to instruct on this Section
also.
POINT II:

THIS COURT MAY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON SECTIONS 76-5-102.5,
76-5-102, AND 76-5-103, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON OTHER
NECESSARILY INCLUDED LESSER OFFENSES, AS
MANIFEST INJUSTICE WOULD RESULT OTHERWISE

As argued in Appellants'

initial Brief to this Court, ~U

19(c), allows this Court to review error assigned to instruct~
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in order to avoid manifest injustice, notwithstanding a party's
failure to object or request specific instructions.

Accordingly,

if it is necessary to avoid manifest injustice, this Court may
review the Trial Court's refusal to instruct on the three offenses
listed in Point I, above, even if Appellants' requests and
objections are found to be inadequate or non-existent.

Likewise,

this Court may also review the need for giving instructions on
other lesser included offenses argued for in Point III of
Appellants' initial Brief and addressed again in Point III,
herein.
In its responsive Brief, the State argues that Appellants
have not made a showing of the needed manifest injustice.
However, in attempting to establish such manifest injustice
Appellants are in a "damned if they do - damned if they don't"
predicament.

They cannot secure this Court's review if they do

not make a showing of manifest injustice; but they cannot make a
showing of manifest injustice if this Court does not consider the
other points in their Appeal.
Appellants contend that manifest injustice resulted when they
were denied the right to take their theory of the case to the
jury because the Trial Court wrongfully limited the scope of the
jury's consideration by wrongfully limiting the number of lesser
included crimes in its instructions.

This Court must consider

whether there were additional lesser included offenses within the
greater charge of Aggravated Sexual Assault and whether there was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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evidence that could have caused reasonable men to acquit
Appellants on the greater charge and convict them on one or

~

of the omitted lesser charges before it can rule on the issue
manifest injustice.
Further, the crime charged was a felony of the first
The conviction was for a felony of the second degree.

d~r

The

offenses for which Appellants feel they were entitled to
instructions range from a felony of the second degree, to fek
of the third degree, down to a class B misdemeanor.

The term

imprisonment for a felony of the first degree is 5 years to li:
Section 76-3-203(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953; the term of
imprisonment for a felony of the second degree is 1 to 15 year
Section 76-3-203(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953; the term of
imprisonment for a felony of the third degree is not more than
years, Section 76-3-203(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953; the ter
imprisonment for a class B misdemeanor is not more than 6 mont
Section 76-3-204(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

If the Trial

Court should have instructed the Jury on other lesser includea
offenses, then it was manifestly unjust for the Trial Court

M

do so in light of the immense variance between the term of
imprisonment for the offense the Appellants were convicted of
the terms of imprisonment for the offenses that the jury shoui
have rightfully considered.

See again those cases cited in~

II of Appellants initial brief, i.e.: August vs. U.S., 257 F.
(1918); State v. Cobo, 60 P2d 592,

(1936); State v. Close, 49~
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287,

(1972); State vs. Marks, 602 P2d 1344,

Baker, 617 P2d 39,

(1979); State vs.

(1980).

If this Court finds that other lesser included offenses
should have been considered by Appellants' jury then this Court
should also find that manifest injustice resulted - Appellants
were denied their vital right to take their theory of the case to
the jury in a setting of a grave and serious charged offense and
convictions of long terms of imprisonment.

POINT III:

FORCIBLE SODOMY IS NOT THE ONLY POSSIBLE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WITHIN AGGRAVATED
SEXUAL ASSAULT.

Appellants agree that State vs. Brennan, states the rule in
determining lesser included offenses:
•.. The greater offense includes a lesser one when establishment of the greater would necessarily include proof of all
the elements necessary to prove the lesser. State vs.
Brennan, 371 P2d 27, (1962).
The elements of Aggravated Sexual Assault, as charged in the
Information are:

l)
2)
3)

4)

5)
6)

Engaging in a sexual act;
Involving the genitals of one person and
the mouth of another;
Without the consent of the victim;
Compelling submission to said sexual
act by the threat of death or serious
bodily injury;
To be inflicted imminently;
on said victim. (See: Nature of The Case,
herein)
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Respondent has conceded that Forcible Sodomy, Section

76-5-403(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a necessarily les~
included offense within Aggravated Sexual Assault,

(See Page 6

Brief of Respondent). Likewise Respondent has conceded that
Attempted Forcible Sodomy, is a lesser included offense within
Aggravated Sexual Assault,

(see Page 15 of Brief of Respondent

Assault, Section 76-5-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a

c:

B misdemeanor, is also a lesser included offense within Aggrav:
Sexual Assault.

Assault can be defined as a threat to do bodi:

injury to another, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence.

To establish Aggravated Sexual Assault, one must pre

a threat of death or serious bodily injury to another.

Proofc

that element necessarily includes proof of a threat to do bodil
injury to another - an element of Assault.

Similarly

establishment of the element that the actor threatens imminent
injury or death is part of the proof of Aggravated Sexual Assau
Proof of that element necessarily includes proof of a show of
immediate force or violence - an element of assault.

Admitted\.

the wording is different but the meaning is the same.

In

ord~

for an actor to threaten imminent injury he must accompany his
threat with a show of immediate force or violence.

One might t

threateningly, but his words alone cannot portend imminent inju:
without a concomitant showing of his ability to muster immediat:
force or violence.

Aggravated Sexual Assault is just what the

name implies - an assault, primarily, with sexual motivations a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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goals, aggravated by threats or infliction of serious injury or
death.

As such, simply assault is necessarily included within the

greater prohibited act.
Aggravated Assault, Section 76-5-103, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, a felony in the third degree, is also a lesser offense
within Aggravated Sexual Assault.

An aggravated assault is an

assault accompanied by the use of a deadly weapon or such means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

Again,

proof of a threat to do bodily injury is necessarily accomplished
by establishing a threat of death or serious bodily injury; and
proof of a .show of immediate force or violence is necessarily
accomplished by establishing a threat to inflict that injury
imminently on one's victim.

Further, proof of the use of a deadly

weapon or such means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury is necessarily accomplished in establishing a threat
to inflict death or serious bodily injury imminently on one's
victim.

One must prove that a deadly weapon or force was used in

order to establish a threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury.

Words, alone, make for hollow threats; use of a deadly

weapon or force is necessary to establish the imminent quality of
the threat.

One cannot threaten imminent death or serious bodily

injury without exhibiting the immediate capability to inflict
death or serious bodily injury; and one cannot exhibit the
immediate capability to inflict death or serious bodily injury
without using a deadly weapon or means or force likely to produce

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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death or serious bodily injury.
Respondent asserts that Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner,
Section 76-5-103.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cannot be ales
included offense within Aggravated Sexual Assault as both of~
are made felonies of the second degree by statute.
disagree.

Appellants

Aggravated Sexual Assault carries the penalty of a

felony of the first degree; see Section 76-5-405 (2), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
Respondent does make a creditable point when it asserts f
both Assault by a Prisoner, Section 76-5-102.5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner, Section
76-5-103.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are not lesser included
offenses within the charged offense by reason of the additioni
element of the actor's status as a prisoner. Appellants, howeve
assert that the status of the actor is germain only to sentenc:
and that both of these offenses are lesser included offenses
within Aggravated Sexual Assault for the same reasons as Assaul
and Aggravated Assault.
Appellants concede here that Respondent has prevailed in:
argument that Forcible Sexual Abuse, Section 76-5-404, is note
lesser included offense in this case.
It is urged that the offenses of Attempted Forcible

Sodo~

Assault, Aggravated Asssault, Assault by a Prisoner, and
Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner are necessarily lesser inclu~
offenses within Aggravated Sexual Assault.
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POINT IV:

EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT APPELLANTS' TRIAL ESTABLISHED
A RATIONAL BASIS FOR A FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
WERE NOT GUILTY OF THE CHARGED GREATER OFFENSE
OF AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT BUT WERE GUILTY OF
ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES: ATTEMPTED FORCIBLE SODOMY, ASSAULT,
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ASSAULT BY A PRISONER,
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY A PRISONER.

Appellants agree with Respondent that the rule for
instructing the jury on lesser included offenses is codified in
Section 76-1-402(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"The Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury
with respect to included offenses unless there is a rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the Defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense."
Respondent correctly points out that the above statute is
worded in the conjunctive sense.

There must be both a rational

basis to acquit on the greater charge and a rational basis to
convict on the lesser.

But Respondent incorrectly asserts that in

this case none of the lesser offenses should have been charged as
the evidence could not support a conviction on any of them.
This Court's test for a rational basis to instruct on lesser
included offense has been stated and affirmed many times:
"The well established general rule, that the jury should
be instructed on lesser included offenses when such a convict ion would be warranted by any reasonable view of the
evidence, is in accord with and supported by our Statutory
Law." (Emphasis added.)
State vs. Close, supra.
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See also:

State v. Johnson, 185 p2d 738,

Castillo, 457 P2d 618,

( 194 7) ; State vs.

( 1969); State vs. Gillian, 463 P2d Bll,

( 1970); State vs. Bell, Supra; State vs. Torres, 619 P2d 694,
( 1980); State vs. Dou9herty, 550 P2d 175,
jurisdictions have ruled similarly:
16 S.CT. 839,

Stevenson vs. United

(1896); Bowers vs. People, 617 P2d 560,

People vs. Glenn, 615 P2d 700,
1027,

( 1976) . Other
Sta~

(1980);

(1980); State vs. Jimerson, 618

(1980).
This Court has also stated the same rule in the negative·

instructions on lesser offenses must be given unless there is:
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense.
Fer9uson, 279 P.55,

See: State vs.

(1929) and State vs. Chestnut, 621 P2d 122'

( 1980).
This Court has also formulated a settled method for apply:
the above-cited rule:
"The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge is
to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict
is that we review the record in the light favorable to ~
jury's verdict. However, in this situation where the
question raised relates to the refusal to submit includ~
offenses, it is our duty to survey the whole evidence a~
the inferences naturally to be deduced therefrom to see
whether there is any reasonable basis therein which wouN
support a conviction of the lesser offense." Gillian, su:
Respondent has likened this case to the situation which
occured in Dou9herty, supra.
complete innocence.

There Defendant-Appellant claimei

He claimed to have been an unwitting part,·

the sale of marijuana.

This Court rightfully refused to find
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error in the refusal to give an instruction on the lesser included
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance.

Dougherty had

not shown any evidence to support a conviction on the lesser
offense.

All of his evidence pointed to either guilt of the

greater offense or complete innocence.
But in reviewing the entire transcript in this case, in the
attitude required by Gillian, supra, this Court will find that,
unlike the Defendant in Dougherty, neither Appellant held himself
out as blameless.

Rather this Court will find substantial

evidence was admitted from which reasonable men could have formed
both a rational basis to acquit Appellants on the greater charge
and a rational basis to convict Appellants on one or more of the
lesser offenses.
Defendant, Elliott's witness, Carl William Howe, testified he
had not seen either Appellant perform or attempt to perform
sodomy on the victim on the date in question, although he did observe activity which the jury might have considered an assault
had they been so instructed; page 144, line 17, through page 147,
line 11; page 150, line 1 through page 151, line 30.
Appellant Clayton told the Jury he slapped and punched the
victim but denied threatening him with death or serious bodily
injury and further denied attempting sodomy on the victim: page
157, line 26 through page 160, line 23; page 161, line 21 through
page 161, line 28; page 163, line 20 through page 164, line 29;
page 165, line 12 through page 170, line 13; page 172, line 15
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through page 173, line 7.
Appellant Elliott also repeatedly admitted assaulting

t~

victim yet denied making threats of death or serious bodily Lor making attempts at sodomy on the victim: page 175, line 24
through page 183, line 12; page 184, line 7 through page 187,
12.
One reasonable view of the above testimony is that Appel!
did not commit nor attempt to commit sodomy on their victim.
Another reasonable view is that they did not threaten to infli·
their victim with imminent death or serious bodily injury, erg
Aggravated Sexual Assault was committed.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to view that same
evidence as warranting a finding that Appellants did commit an
assault upon their victim - that they attempted, with unlawful
force or violence, to do bodily injury or that they

threaten~

do bodily injury while exhibiting immediate force or violence.
Reasonable men could have found that the above evidence
indicated a force likely to produce serious bodily injury was
used but that Appellants did not attempt sodomy.

Such action

would be Aggravated Assault.
Reasonable jurists could have also concluded that the
Appellants, without threatening death or serious bodily injury,
attempted to force sodomy on their victim but did not
succeed.

That would constitute Attempted Forcible Sodomy.

Certainly, there are reasonable views of the foregoing

-14-
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evidence that would warrant a conviction on one or more of the
lesser included offenses.

There is also a reasonable view of the

evidence that would warrant acquittal on the greater charged
offense (the jury did subscribe to that view).

But, by submitting

only three possible verdicts to the jury, the Trial Court
precluded any findings that reflected rational beliefs that
Appellants were guilty of Attempted Forcible Sodomy or Assault or
Aggravated Assault.
Respondent has stated the jury "must" have been convinced
Appellants committed sodomy because they returned a verdict marked
guilty on Forcible Sodomy.

That is not necessarily so.

The jury

may have been convinced "a" crime was committed but they may have
reached their verdict not by choosing the lesser included offense
they believed in but by choosing the lesser of two evils.

The

Trial Court's instructions, in effect, limited the jury to a
consideration of only a part of the evidence.

As this Court has

held:
"It is always a delicate matter for a trial court to
withhold from the jury the right to find accused guilty
of a lesser or included offense and determine the question
of the state of the evidence as a matter of law. That should
be done only in clear cases." State vs. Hyams, 230 P. 349,
( 1924).
CONCLUSIONS
In light of the charged offense and the factual setting in
this case, there were more lesser included offenses than Forcible
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Sodomy.

A reasonable viewing of the evidence admitted at the

trial of this matter would warrant an acquittal of the

charg~

offense and at the same time convictions on one or more of the
lesser included offenses.

This Court should review the Trial

Court's failure to instruct on the various lesser included
offenses less manifest injustice result.

This Court should

~

reverse the Judgment of the lower Court or remand this case fu
new trial in order that Appellants may have a jury consider

au

the necessarily lesser included offenses that are appropriate,
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